Mumbai: A chain of air traffic control lapses, including failure to assign a different flight level, inadequate shift handovers and non-updating of aircraft estimates in the automated system, have been listed as the probable causes that led to a serious air proximity (Airprox) incident involving a Qatar Airways and an EL AL Israel Airlines Boeing 777 over the Mumbai airspace in March 2024, according to a report released by Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) on Saturday. The aircraft came close to each other seriously at a point over the Arabian Sea, in the airspace manned by the Mumbai air traffic control’s oceanic control centre.The incident that occurred at 7.36 am (IST) on March 24, 2024, involved Qatar Airways flight QTR8E, a Boeing 777-300ER operating from Doha to Male, and EL AL Israel Airlines flight ELY081, a Boeing 777-200 flying from Tel Aviv to Bangkok. Both aircraft were cruising at 35,000 feet on intersecting airways that crossed at a certain point.
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Under the laid-down procedural control standards, controllers were required to maintain either 10 minutes (approximately 80 nautical miles) of longitudinal separation or 1,000 feet of vertical separation. “The minimum longitudinal and vertical separation recorded between the two flights was 9.1 NM (approximately one minute) and zero feet at 0206 UTC (7.36 am),” the report said. “The standard minimum separation was reduced to its lowest value, that is, 1 minute, at flight level 35,000,” it said.The report said the first air traffic controller on duty noticed the developing conflict after reviewing the flight progress strips but decided to wait for updated pilot position reports before issuing a level change. Although both aircraft later reported their estimates, the controller assigned no revised flight level and the estimates were not entered into the Controller Coordination Work Station (CCWS), which assists controllers by generating synthetic tracks and conflict alerts, it said. When the first controller handed over duties at 7 am, the specific conflict was not communicated to the relieving controller. The second controller remained occupied resolving another traffic conflict and did not detect the loss of separation. A second handover at 7.30 am also omitted any briefing about the developing conflict. The third controller recognised the situation only around 7.36 am, by which time the two aircraft had already breached the prescribed separation minima at 35,000 feet. The controller then instructed the EL AL flight to descend to 33,000 feet, after which separation increased as the aircraft continued on diverging routes.Among the safety recommendations were strengthening controller handover procedures, reinforcing training and supervision in procedural air traffic control, ensuring timely updating of aircraft estimates in automated systems, and reviewing the performance and reliability of conflict detection tools used in the Mumbai Oceanic Control Centre.
